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MANAGING RESOURCES WITH INTERSTATE COMPACTS:

A

PERSPECTIVE FROM THE GREAT LAKES
JESSICA A. BIELECKI *

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Great Lakes Basin is the largest fresh water system
outside the polar ice caps,' covering 300,000 square miles,2 and
stretching 750 miles from east to west. 3 It holds ninety percent of
North America's fresh water, which equates to six quadrillion
gallons. 4 This is enough water to submerge
the continental forty5
deep.
feet
half
a
and
eight states nine
Despite its size, without protections, the Great6 Lakes Basin7
could be in danger. Fresh water shortages both inside and outside

B.S. 2004, University of Mary Washington, J.D. 2007, The University
at
Buffalo School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Barry Boyer
for his assistance in researching and drafting this article.
1 See Dennis L. Schomack, Chair, U.S. Section, International Joint Commission,
Remarks, 5 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L. SCI & POL'Y 387, 388 (2003).
2 STEPHEN R. VINA & PERVAZE SHEIKH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GREAT
LAKES WATER WITHDRAWALS:

LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, CRS REPORT

32956, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/
05jun /RL32956.pdf.
3Agreement to Protectand Conserve Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Basin
Announced, ENVIRONMENT DEC NEWSLETTER (New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation), Jan. 2006, available at http://www.dec.state.
ny.us/website/environmentdec/2006a/greatlakes 121305.html.
4 Great Lakes Information Network, The Great Lakes Overview,
http://www.great-lakes.net/lakes/#overview.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
The Great Lakes hold twenty percent of the world's freshwater. Id.
5

1d.

6 Examples of water shortages within the United States include the Midwest
where the Ogallala Aquifer has been over-drawn and the Missouri River where
flows have been lowered by climate change, which in turn has lowered the
Mississippi River's water levels. See Adele Hurley and Andrew Nikiforuk,
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the United States could make the Great Lakes "an inviting" target
for diversions. 8 Only about one percent of the Great Lakes' water9
year.
is replenished naturally through the hydrologic cycle 1each
0
Water that is not returned through the cycle will be lost.
If water levels diminish too much, the Basin ecosystem
could be disrupted. Furthermore, because "[w]ater is the lifeline
for key Great Lakes industries," insufficient supplies could cripple
the economy." The challenge, therefore, is to create a management
system capable of establishing and maintaining a balance between
resource conservation and human needs.
The American and Canadian governments have recognized
the value and importance of the Great Lakes and have been
Don't drain on our parade, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, July 29, 2005, at 1, available

at http://www.powi.ca/pdfs/waterdiversion/hurley-nikiforuk-globeandmail2005.
pdf. See also MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO
STOP THE CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD'S WATER 15-18 (2002) (describing
a "parched America").
It was estimated that 450 million people currently experience fresh water
shortages. This number is expected to grow to three billion by 2025. See James
S. Lockhead, The National Water Crisis: A Great Lakes Response, 4 TOL. J.
GREAT LAKES' L. SCI. & POL'Y 241, 241 (2001). See also BARLOW & CLARKE
supra note 6, at 24 (stating "[b]y the year 2025, the world will contain 2.6
billion more people than it holds today, but as many as two-thirds of those
people will be living in conditions of serious water shortage, and one-third will
exceed availability by 56 percent").
7

8

See Peter V. MacAvoy, The Great Lakes Charter: Toward a Basin-wide

Strategy for Managing the Great Lakes, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 49, 51
(1986) (stating "the enormous lakes pose an inviting target for western and
southwestern regions of the United States looking to appropriate new supplies of
water to replace or augment their existing sources").
9 See International Joint Commission, Protection of the Waters of the Great
Lakes Review of the Recommendations in the February 2000 Report 1 (Aug.
2004) availableat www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/ID 1560.pdf.
1o See BARLOW &
only by rainfall").

CLARKE,

supra note 6, at 5 (stating "fresh water is renewable

11 See Choosing Fresh Water Forever, DECIDING THE FATE OF THE
GREAT LAKES (Alliance for the Great Lakes), 2001, at 2, available at
http://www.greatlakes.org/conservation/Annex%202001 %20fact%20sheets.pdf.
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working together for years in an effort to protect this multijurisdictional, complex resource. This partnership has resulted in a
number of protection agreements, the most recent being the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources
Agreement1 2 and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Water Resources Compact (Great Lakes Compact), 13 which were
approved by the eight Great Lakes Basin Governors and two
Canadian Premiers on December 13, 2005.14 If ratified, these
agreements could have significant implications for water
management, and more generally
for the future management of
15
multi-jurisdictional resources.
This paper will focus on the use of interstate compacts as a
multi-jurisdictional resource management device.16 Specifically,
12

Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources

Agreement, Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/
docs/12-13-05/Great Lakes-StLawrenceRiverBasinSustainableWater
ResourcesAgreement.pdf
[hereinafter
Sustainable
Water
Resources
Agreement].
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Dec. 13,
2005, available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/Great_
Lakes-StLawrenceRiverBasinWaterResources_Compact.pdf [hereinafter
Compact].
13

The Great Lakes Basin States include Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin and the Canadian Premiers are
Ontario and Quebec.
14

Jeffery Rothfeder describes the idea of controlling water quantity in the Great
Lakes as "demonstrating a refreshing and essential difference from our more
typical aggressive water management efforts; we are proving that we have
perhaps finally learned something from our past mistakes .... ." JEFFERY
ROTHFEDER, EVERY DROP FOR SALE 137 (2001). See generally Noah Hall,
Toward a New EnvironmentalFederalism: Interstate Water Management in the
Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 413 (discussing how the new
Great Lakes Compact "could serve as a cooperative horizontal federalism model
for interstate management of natural resources and environmental protection").
'5

16

Examples of the successful management of resources with interstate compacts

include the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Authority, the Metropolitan
Washington Council of Governments, the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, and the Northwest Power Planning Council. See Stephen David Galowitz,
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the Great Lakes Compact will be used to illustrate why and how
compacts can be effective. Compacts, like contracts, are attractive
because they can be tailored to meet a region or resource's specific
needs. 17 This flexibility will allow the Great Lakes States to attain
power within the
a primary objective: keep decision-making
18
citizens."
region's
the
of
"hands
This paper will first review the historical and legal context
of the Great Lakes Compact. Then, it will look at how the Compact
was created, followed by a discussion of the benefits and criticisms
of interstate compacts. Finally, the characteristics of other
available management devices and compacts will be compared and
contrasted with the Great Lakes Compact.
II.

LEGAL HISTORY AND CONTEXT

Similar to the Great Lakes ecosystem, the layers and levels
of political and legal institutions overlying the natural basin are
complex and diverse. Two federal governments, eight states, two
provinces, and a list of American, Canadian and international
agencies operate within the Basin. In addition, there are millions of
private actors including industry representatives, environmentalists
and residents. The difficulty in establishing an effective, basinwide water quantity management system is coordinating all these
stakeholders.
To understand and assess the need for a new management
regime, earlier agreements must first be analyzed. It is the gaps

Interstate Metro-Regional Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 27 REAL PROP.

PROB. & TR. J. 49, 119-23 (1993).
17

See BROUN

INTERSTATE

ET AL.,

COMPACTS:

THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF

A

PRACTITIONER'S

GUIDE

29

(American

Bar

Association 2006); see also infra note 143 and accompanying text.
18 The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact:
Hearing on H.R. 574 Before the H. Comm. On Economic Development and
Environment, 1 2 6th Gen. Assem. (Ohio May 17, 2006) (statement of Peter

Johnson, Program Director, Council of Great Lakes Governors) [hereinafter
Johnson Testimony] available at http://www.theoec.org/PDFs/Legislation!
LegGPTCGLG574.pdf.
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these agreements left behind that Compact drafters were charged to
fill.
A.

1909 U.S. - CanadaBoundary Waters Treaty

Formal Great Lakes protection efforts began at the turn of
the twentieth century. The first agreement to address the Basin's
water quantity management was the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
(BWT). 19 The BWT created the International Joint Commission
(IJC) 20 which was given limited jurisdiction over boundary

waters. 2 1 As discussed below, this limited jurisdiction has raised
questions because Lake Michigan is not a boundary waterway.22
The BWT is still in effect today, but has been supplemented by a series of Water Quality Agreements, the first of which
was signed in 1972.23

19Boundary Waters Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548 [hereinafter BWT].
20

See id. at art. VII. For a discussion of the IJC's role and responsibilities see

Catherine A. Cooper, The Management of InternationalEnvironmentalDisputes
in the Context of Canada-UnitedStates Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of
Techniques and Mechanisms, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 247, 254-55 (1986).
21

See BWT, supra note 19, at art. II.

22

See Ministry of Natural Resources, Technical Fact Sheet Enhancing Existing

Great lakes Protections Through Charter Annex Implementing Agreements,
Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/nmr/water/greatlakes/
TFS-GLCA%20Agreement%20v.pdf; see infra Part IV.C. ..
23

The first Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) focused on

controlling oxygen depletion, algae growth, and decay. Later agreements
address the elimination and release of persistent toxic pollutants. See CLAUDIA
COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY: CURRENT ISSUES, CRS REPORT 96-442, (1996) available at ncseonline.org/NLE/

CRSreports/Natural/nrgen-10.cfm?. For more information on the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) see EPA, Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement 1978, February 15, 2007, available at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/
glwqa/1978/index.html (stating the GLWQA "reaffirms the rights and
obligations of Canada and the United States under the Boundary Waters Treaty
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B.

InternationalTrade Law

International Trade Laws, such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 24 and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT),25 add to the complexities of water
resource management. Environmental protection under these
agreements can be uncertain. For example, while NAFTA has been
"hailed the greenest" trade agreement, commentators have argued
Similarly, GATT
its ability to protect the environment is limited.26
2
7
protection.
environmental
provides only limited
The international arena is further complicated by the fact
that it can be difficult to determine when these agreements apply to
and has become a major focus of Commission Activity") (last visited February
17, 2007).
24

North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32

I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
25

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55

U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
26

See Raymond MacCallum, Evaluating the Citizen Submission Procedure

Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 8 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 395, 397-99 (1997) (stating NAFTA is referred to

as the "greenest trade agreement ever" but "this claim is largely based on the
fact that sustainable development and environmental protection get a few
cursory mentions in the NAFTA"). See also Veena Dubal et al., Why are Some
Trade Agreements 'Greener' than Others?, 16 EARTH ISLAND JOURNAL 44, 44,

47 (2001-02); Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and
Consumer Protection of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
Concerning Dominican-CentralAmerican Free Trade Agreement (April 28,
2005) (Testimony of David F. Waskow, Director of the International Friends of
the Earth), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/
Hearings/04282005hearing1489/Waskow.pdf (stating under NAFTA, "multinational investors have been able to demand compensation for the implementation
of legitimate environmental protections").
27

Exemptions can be adopted if they are "necessary to protect human, animal or

plant life or health . . .or relating to the conservation of exhaustive natural

resources." See GATT,supra note 25, at art. XX(b), (g); see also id. at XX(g)
(measures can be taken if they "are made in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption").
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water. 28 Generally, water in its "natural state" is not considered a
good or product, and therefore, is outside the scope of the trade
agreements. 29 But, if water is captured and enters "into commerce"
it becomes a good subject to international regulation. 30 The
question is, at what point, for example, does bottled water, become
answer is unclear as illustrated by current litigation in
a good? The
3
Michigan . 1

C.

Great Lakes Charterof 1985

In the 1980's, the Basin Governors formally teamed with
the Canadian Premiers to create the Great Lakes Charter of 1985.32
33
The Charter focused on the Basin as one, interconnected system
and recognized that water-withdrawal decisions and actions had to
consider this interconnectivity. 34 This regional level of thinking is

"[T]his legal issue has been widely debated in academic journals .... PETER

28

ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS

202 (2006). For additional informa-

tion on the controversy of treating water as a commodity see generally Cynthia
Baumann, Note: Water Wars: Canada's Upstream Battle to Ban Bulk Water
Export, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 109 (2001)
See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE

29

GREAT LAKES: REVIEW OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE FEBRUARY

REPORT

2000

5 (2000).

See Marcia Valiante, Harmonization of Great Lakes Water Management in

30

the Shadow of NAFTA, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 525, 531 (2004).
See e.g., Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Water, 269

31

Mich. App. 25 (2005) (discussing the dispute over the regulation of groundwater
and the standard for determining whether or not withdrawals should be allowed).
32

See Council of Great Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes Charter of 1985, Feb.

11, 1985 [hereinafter Charter].
See Valiante, supra note 30, at 529 ("[W]hat was unique about these
arrangements is that they were the first steps in a governance regime for a Great
Lakes region, defined in geographic terms.").
33

34 See Charter, supra note 32, at 1.
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illustrated by the fact that the Basin is referred
to in geographic
35
terms, instead of traditional, political terms.
While the Charter of 1985 represents a successful shift in
focus, it has floundered in implementation. For example, Principle
V of the Charter called for the development of a common database
and creation of a basin-wide management plan. 36 This information
was, however, only intermittently collected and management plans
were not created.37 Furthermore, the Charter is only a good faith
agreement which "depends wholly' on the commitment of its
signatories to fulfill[] its intent." The Charter itself has no
binding legal authority and as 39
a result, the States have not
consistently implemented its goals.
D.

U.S. WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT (WRDA)

OF

1986
In the following year, 1986, Congress created the Water
Resources Development Act (WRDA). 40 This Act requires unanimous consent from the Great Lakes Governors before any diversion can be made outside of the Basin. 4 1 It does not, however,

" See id. at 1.
36

See id. at 3-5.

See SpeakontheGreatLakes.org, Great Lakes Charter Annex Implementing
Agreements
Background,
Basics,
and
Next Steps,
http://www.
speakongreatlakes.org/j oint-engo/annex-background-and-summary-08-05-4.doc
last visited April 15, 2007) [hereinafter SpeakontheGreatLakes.org]. A specific
example is Michigan, who "failed to comply with their management and
regulatory commitment." See Hall, supra note 15, at 425.
37

38

See MacAvoy, supra note 8, at 57.

39 For example, States have adopted different ways of tracking withdrawals and

reporting levels to the Great Lakes Commission. Reporting was done on monthly, quarterly, and annual bases, making data irreconcilable
40 Water Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (2000).
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"include a standard for reviewing diversions, the process to be
used for reviewing a proposal, nor the process to be used for
challenging a decision," making it vulnerable to legal challenges.42
Clearly, something more was needed, otherwise it would be
"unlikely [that the Basin would] retain authority over water
management decision making." 43 A new management tool would
have to address both the Basin's desire to retain authority over
withdrawal decisions and any future attempts to tap into the Great
Lakes.
E.

Annex 2001

On June 18, 2001, the eight Great Lakes State Governors
and two Canadian Premiers met in Niagara Falls, New York to
discuss management of the Great Lakes' water resources. The
result was a new, good faith agreement, the Great Lakes Charter
Annex 2001. 44 Annex 2001 acted as "a mechanism to bridge the
gap between the charter and the WRDA. It buil[t] on the 1985
Charter and focus[ed] on a standard for reviewing all water
withdrawals, not only diversions. 4 5 Its main provisions required
the development of a binding agreement to establish a decision-

See 42 USCS § 1962d-20(d) ("No water shall be diverted or exported from
any portion of the Great Lakes within the United States, or from any tributary
within the United States of any of the Great Lakes, for use outside the Great
Lakes Basin unless such diversion or export is approved by the Governor of
each of the Great Lakes States.").
41

42

See Johnson Testimony, supra note 18. These gaps in the WRDA make

adequate protection against diversions questionable, at best. For a discussion of
legal and constitutional vulnerabilities see infra Part IV.C.2.
41

See Johnson Testimony, supra note 18.

The Council of Great Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes Charter Annex 2001,
June 18, 2001 [hereinafter Annex 2001].
44

45

See Jeffery E. Edstrom et al., An Approach for Identifying Improvements

Under the Great Lakes CharterAnnex 2001, 4 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L. Sci. &

POL'Y 335, 336 (2002).
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making standard 46for the review of new and existing water
withdrawal limits.
Annex 2001 has been reputed as creating "the foundation
for a harmonized water management system motivated by
environmental concern and based on the principles of nondiscrimination, conservation and resource improvement, making it
capable of meeting international trade standards. 47
Additionally, unlike previous agreements, Annex 2001
specified a decision-making standard based on a number of factors,
such as:
1.) Preventing or minimizing Basin water loss
through return flow and implementation of
environmentally sound and economically
feasible water conservation measures; and
2.) No significant adverse individual or cumulative
impacts to the quantity or quality of the waters
and water-dependent resources of the Great
Lakes Basin; and
3.) An improvement to the waters and waterdependent natural resources of the Great Lakes
Basin; and
4.) Compliance with applicable state, provincial,
48
federal, and international laws and treaties.
Following the 2001 signing, all ten jurisdictions along with
advisory committees, technical experts and federal committee
representatives worked together in an effort to implement Annex
2001.49

46

See SAMUEL

W. SPECK, COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, PROTECTING

7-8 (2004)
available at http://www.nemw.org/annex-briefing.pdf [hereinafter CONGRESAND RESTORING OUR GREAT LAKES CONGRESSIONAL DEBRIEFING
SIONAL DEBRIEFING].
47

See Valiante, supra note 30, at 539.

48

See Annex 2001, supra note 44, at 2.

2007]
III.

INTERSTATE COMPACTS
CREATING THE GREAT LAKES INTERSTATE COMPACT

The creation of Annex 2001 was a breakthrough not only
for the Great Lakes, but also for water management in general.
Annex 2001 addressed many "unprecedented protections" includeing a commitment from the Signatories to make all water withdrawal decisions. 50 Annex 2001 set the stage for the creation of the
Compact and Sustainable Water Resources Agreement. 5 1 In
addition, it encouraged public involvement throughout the "preparation and implementation" process.52
A.

The First Draft: ReleasedJuly 19, 2004

On July 18, 2004, three years after the signing of the Annex
2001 Charter, the first draft of the implementation agreement was
released.53 This draft called for a compact among the Basin States
49 See Daniel Injerd, Ill. Dep't. of Natural Res., Annex 2001-An Update 10

(Feb. 15, 2005) (powerpoint available at http://www.nipc.org/environment/
slmrwsc/conferences/I1 CInjerd.pdf).
50

See Press Release, Council of Great Lakes Governors, Minnesota Makes

History as First State to Approve Landmark Great Lakes Compact (Feb. 20,
2007), available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/Minnesota_
CompactPressRelease_2-20-07.pdf.
51 See The Council of Great Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes Annex: A
Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter,June 31, 2006 (stating
"the Governors and Premiers commit to develop and implement a new common,
resource-based conservation standard and apply it to new water withdrawal
proposals from the Waters of the Great Lakes Basin").
52 See id. at Directive #2.
53 See July 19, 2004 Draft Great Lakes Basin Water Resources Compact,

available at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/water/greatlakes/annex200 1/Great Lakes
Compact 7-19-04-Public Release.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Draft]. This draft was
created by the "Working Group," which was composed of staff from all the
Signatory States. See Council of Great Lakes Governors Great Lakes Water
Management Initiative Requestfor Public Comment, June 30, 2005, availableat
http://www.eany.org/issues/topics/great-lakes-comments.pdf [hereinafter Initiative Request for Public Comment].
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and a good faith agreement between the States and Canadian
Provinces.54 In addition, it required new diversions to meet
specific
55
standards.
improvement
and
flow
conservation, return
Following the draft's release, over 10,000 comments were
received by the Council 56 and approximately 1,000 people attended
more than thirty public meetings.5 7 Concerns were raised on a
variety of fronts. The business community was concerned with
predictability, timeliness and the cost of using water for industrial
and commercial purposes. 58 Environmentalists were seeking
enforcement, uniformity and development of state water management programs, 59 while Canadians were concerned the agreement
60
would "rob Canada of its shared authority over the Great Lakes."
The working group was charged with reviewing, considering and
incorporating these comments.
B.

New Draft Released June 30, 2005

After considering all comments, the drafters made important changes. 61 For example, the waters improvement definition
was not included.62 In addition, the drafters added a clause for the

54

See 2004 Draft, supra note 53.

55See SpeakontheGreatLakes.org, supra note 37, 4-5.
56

See

57

See Initiative Requestfor Public Comment, supra note 53.

VINA & SHEIKH,

supra note 2, at 13.

8See CONGRESSIONAL DEBRIEFING, supra note 46, at 10.
9See id. at 11.
60

See Editorial, Ominous Silence on Great Lakes,

TORONTO STAR,

Oct. 19,

2004, at A22.
61

The new draft was released June 30, 2005. Draft Great Lakes Basin Water

Resources Compact, June 30, 2005 available at http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/
mnr/water/greatlakes/GREATLAKES BASINWATERRESOURCESCOM
PACT_6-30-05.pdf [hereinafter 2005 Draft].
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general prohibition on diversions. 63 The draft did, however, allow
exceptions for straddling communities, intra-basin transfers and
straddling counties if certain conditions were met. 64 Review for inbasin use was left to the host-jurisdiction 65 and the Council
was
66
programs.
management
water
state
given power to review
C.

Compact and Implementation Agreements Approved
December 2005

On December 13, 2005, the Council of Great Lakes
Governors held a Leadership Summit in Milwaukee. 67 At the
conclusion of the Summit, the eight Basin Governors and two
Provincial Premiers approved and signed the final Annex Implementing Agreements, including the Great Lakes Compact and
Sustainable Water Resources Agreement. These agreements
provide details for how to manage and implement the necessary
69
framework to protect the multi-jurisdictional Basin waters.
62

Cf 2004 Draft, Supra note 53 at § 1.2 with 2005 Draft, Supra note 61 at § 1.2.

63

See id. § 4.6.

See id. § 4.7. These exceptions are, however, meant to be limited and strictly
controlled. See Ministry of Natural Resources, Summary of the Revised Great
Lakes Charter Annex Implementing Agreements Fact Sheet, June 30, 3005,
http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/mnr/csb/news/20O5/jun3Ofs05.html.
64

65

See 2005 Draft, supra note 61, § 4.2.

66

See id. § 3.6.

67

See Great Lakes, LANSING

STATE JOURNAL

(Michigan), Dec. 13, 2005, at 8A;

see also James Janega, States OK Stopper for the Great Lakes; Pact would
outlaw increaseddiversion, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 13, 2005, at 1.
See Press Release, Council of Great Lakes Governors, Governors and
premiers Sign Agreements to Protect Great Lakes Water (Dec. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/Annex 2001
PressRelease_12-13-05.pdf [hereinafter Council of Great Lakes Governors
68

Press Release].
69

See id.
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Specifically, the Great Lakes Compact bans new and
increased diversions 70 and creates firm, detailed regional goals and
objectives. 7' Also, there is explicit recognition that the Basin's
water is a "precious public natural resource shared and held in trust
by the States"72 and that public involvement is needed to preserve
and protect the region's water. 73 Finally, the new agreement also
guarantees the use of a consistent standard of review.7 4 Governor
Bob Taft of Ohio commented, "[t]he new agreements will improve
and protect the health and economic vitality of the Great Lakes
region and allow future generations to share the same benefits
enjoyed today by millions of families, by businesses, and by
visitors from throughout the world., 75 However, the signing of
these agreements is only the beginning. There is a long road ahead
before implementation is complete.
With implementation pending, it is appropriate to analyze
why the Signatories chose to use an interstate compact to manage

70

The Compact does provide for three exceptions for straddling communities,

intra-basin transfers and straddling counties. See Compact, supra note 13, §4.9.
7"See id. § 4.8.
72

Id. § 1.3(1)(a). It should be noted that the "public trust" language has

generated opposition from Ohio. See James, Hoare, Big GovernmentalProposal
encounters strong opposition, ENVIRONMENT NEWS, Jun. 2007, available at
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld=21210 ("Ohio state Sen. Tim
Grendell (R-Chesterland) strongly opposed language declaring Great Lakes
waters are held in public trust ... Grendell fears the compact will encroach upon
the preexisting private property rights of Ohioans who own farm ponds,
wetlands, and private water wells.")
" See id. § 4.5(3).
See Council of Great Lakes Governors Press Release, supra note 69; see also
BROUN ET AL., supra note 18, at 28 (stating "an interstate compact can provide
member states with a predictable, stable, and enforceable mechanism for policy
control and implementation").
14

75

See Council of Great Lakes Governors Press Release, supra note 68.

76

See discussion infra Part IV. A., B (discussing the process to create and ratify

an interstate compact).
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the Basin waters. The remainder of this paper will focus on the use
and effectiveness of interstate compacts as management tools in
the context of the Great Lakes Compact. Questions to be addressed
include: what are the characteristics of an interstate compact; why
was an interstate compact the best available management tool; and
how does the Great Lakes Compact compare to other compacts?
IV.

INTERSTATE COMPACTS: BACKGROUND

An interstate compact is a formal, legally binding agreement between two or more states regarding an interstate issue. 77 It
is the "oldest mechanism available to promote formal interstate
cooperation." 78 While the process for the creation and ratification
of an interstate compact is time consuming and in some cases
burdensome, 79 the benefits of creating an enforceable, stable and
permanent agreement are plentiful. An interstate compact will
enable the Great Lakes Signatories to instill the regional focus they
have been trying to promote for over twenty years.
A.

Creation of the Administrative Body

A compact will identify and/or create a governing body to
implement and fulfill its goals. The Great Lakes Compact calls
See Brevard Crihfield, Introduction to FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN &
MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS ix (1976);
17

see also BROUN ET AL., supra note 17, at 19 (stating "[c]ompacts are legal

contracts with their terms and conditions controlling--even trumping-the
actions and conduct of the member states concerning the subject matter of the
compact").
78

BROUN ET AL., supra note 17, at 3.

79 The average time "from the actual signing or the first ratification, whichever
is earlier, to the date of federal consent, without including the period of
negotiation" for interstate compacts dealing with natural resources is six years
and nine months. FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE
LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 54 (1976).

80 A compact can be administered and implemented in a variety of ways includeing administration by existing agencies, the creation of compact administrators
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for the creation of a Council composed of the Signatories'
Governors. 81 The federal government's role in a compact's governing body can vary depending on the agreement's purpose and
goals. 82 For example, the Great Lakes Compact does not include
the federal government as a Council Member because a primary
objective was to retain
"the [states'] authority over Great Lakes
83
water management."
The Great Lakes Compact Council is charged with the
responsibility to "use the Standard of Review and Decision
procedures contained in or adopted pursuant to th[e] Compact as
the means to exercise their authority .... 84 The Council must also
"identify priorities and develop plans and policies" for the
management of Basin resources 8 and oversee
implementation and
86
programs.
management
State
of
enforcement
B.

Enforcement

Before the Great Lakes Compact can become legally
binding, each state legislature and Congress must ratify the
agreement. If any state fails to complete the ratification process the
and associations or the establishment of intergovernmental agencies. See id. at
29-31; see also BROUN ET AL., supra note 17, at 133-146 for additional
information on the structure of compact governing bodies.
81See Compact, supra note 13, § 2.2.
82

For example, the Upper Colorado River Compact designates the Commission

will be made up of a member of each State and, if the President so desires, one
representative for the United States, whereas the Atlantic State Marine Fisheries
Compact Commission consists of three representatives from each state, each of
which is designated an official role. See ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra
note 79, at 58-59; see also, e.g., BROUN ET AL., supra note 17, at 66-68
(discussing federal participation in compacts).
83

See Johnson Testimony, supra note 18.

84

See Compact, supra note 13, § 3.1.

85 See id.
86 See generally id. at arts. 3, 4.
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compact will not become effective. 87 For example, both the
Delaware River Compact of 1927 and Yellowstone River Compact
failed because one or more 88of the states failed to complete the
requisite ratification process.
The Great Lakes States are actively working towards
ratification and supporters remain optimistic. 89 Throughout the
entire process, the public has been involved and the overall tone
seems supportive. 90 As of July 2007, seven of the eight States had
taken affirmative legislative action in an effort to ratify the
Compact. 91 Minnesota was the first state to ratify.9 2 Illinois' and

87

Even if the compact passes in the state legislatures, all the state's legislation

must be consistent. If it is not, the compact cannot be ratified. For example,
when Missouri and Kansas enacted inconsistent legislation in response to the
creation of the Kansas City Metropolitan Culture District, the compact could not
be sent to Congress until the inconsistency was rectified. See Carlton James
Gausman, Comment, The Interstate Compact As a Solution to Regional Problems: The Kansas City Metropolitan Culture District,45 U. KAN. L. REv. 897,
915 (1997).
88

See

WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS

1785-

1941 Back Pocket Analytical Table (1942).
89

See Great Lakes United, The Great Lakes Charter Annex 2001 - Events

Update, Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.glu.org/english/annex_2001/events_
update.htm?subject=Subsribe%20to%20Clean%20Production%20Newsletter
(last visited May 17, 2007) (discussing state actions). The state ratification
process is predicted to be complete within two years. See id. But cf John
Flesher, Debate over water compact tests unity of GreatLakes region, NEWSDAY Apr. 15, 2007 ("Backers are confident the plan adopted by the governors in
2005 will win needed approval by all eight states and Congress, but acknowledge it probably will take a few more years.").
90 See Johnson Testimony, supra note 18 (listing the public meetings and
participation).
9' The following State information is current as of May 20, 2007. For more up to
date information on State Legislative activities see The Council of Great Lakes
Governors, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact
Implementation, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/Compactlmplementation.
asp#State%20Legislative%2OActivity (last visited May 27, 2007) [hereinafter
CGLG Implementation].
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New York's 94 House and Senate have passed bills approving the
compact. Legislation was pending in both of Michigan's Chambers as well as in one chamber in Indiana9 6 and Pennsylvania.9 7
92 See S.F. 38, 8 5th Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007) (passed Feb. 15, 2007);

see also H.F. 110 38,
2007).

8 5th

Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007) (passed Feb. 1,

9' See H.B. 0375, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Il1. 2007) (passed Mar. 29,
2007 by a vote of 115-0); S.B. 0050, 9 5th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007)
(passed April 25, 2007). For additional bill information see Illinois General
Assembly, Bill Status of SB 0050, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.
asp?DocNum=50&GAID=9&GA=95&DocTypelD=SB&LegID=26826&Sessio
nID=51 (last visited May 18, 2007).
94 See Assemb. 07266 (NY 2007) (passed April 23, 2007) available at

http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A07266&sh=t (last visited Aug. 7, 2007);
S.B. 04324 (passed July 16, 2007), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/
leg/?bn=S04324&sh=t.
" See S. B. 212 (Mich. 2007) (referred to the Committee on Natural Resources
and Environmental Affairs on Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.
legislature.mi.gov/(S(jwbfe43voxp3qw55rpcn2kn2))/mileg.aspx?page=getObjec
t&objectName=2007-SB-0212; H.B. 4336 (Mich. 2007) (referred to Committee
on Great Lakes and Environment Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.
legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billintroduced/House/pdf/2007-HIB4336.pdf; H.B. 4343 (Mich. 2007) (referred to Committee on Great Lakes and
Environment Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/
documents/2007-2008/billintroduced/House/pdf/2007-HIB-4343.pdf.
96

See S.B. 0022, 115 th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007) (assigned to

Energy and Environmental Affairs on Jan. 18, 2007). For additional bill
information see Legislative Services Agency, Bill Info, available at http://www.
in.gov/apps/lsa/session/billwatch/billinfo?year=2007&session=1 &request-getBi
ll&docno=22; SB 0515 (Ind. 2006) (Referred to Committee on Energy
Environmental Affairs on Jan. 23, 2007). However, "action is being postponed
until next year so lawmakers and the governor's staff can work with interested
groups on accompanying legislation to bring the state into compliance." John
Flesher, AP Environmental Writer, Across Great Lakes region, pact faces
different challenges, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, March 30, 2007 available at http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/wisconsin/chi-ap-wi-protectingthelake,
1,767439.story.
97 See H.B. 1705 (PA 2007) (referred to Intergovernmental Affairs July 6, 2007)

available
btCheck.cfm?

at

http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/
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In 2006, Ohio passed a bill in one chamber, but has not taken
action to revive this bill in the99new session. 98 Finally, Wisconsin
had yet to introduce legislation.
If and when the States' ratification process is finally
complete, the compact will then go before Congress. According to
Article III of the United States Constitution, to have an enforceable
interstate compact Congress must give its consent."' ° Once
Congress consents, the agreement will be transformed into federal
law and become enforceable in federal court.10 1 If a signatory fails

txtType=HTM&sessYr=2007&sesslnd=0&billBody=H&billTyp=B&billNbr= 1
705&pn=2255 (last visited Aug. 7, 2007).
" See H.B. 574, 12 6th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006). This Bill passed
through the house on December 16, 2006. See Status on legislativepassage of
the GreatLakes Compact, http://waterwars.wordpress.com/2006/12/ (last visited
May 18, 2007) [hereinafter Status]. The Ohio Senate Bill, S.B. 319, was
introduced on April 27, 2006. See id; see also Ohio Legislative Commission,
Senate Bills-Status Report of Legislation, 12 6th General Assembly,
http://lsc.state.oh.us/coderev/sen 126.nsf/Senate+Bill+Number/0319?OpenDocu
ment (last visited May 18, 2007); see also The Council of Great Lakes
Governors, Great Lakes Compact Moves Forward,The Compass, Sept. 2006, at
1 available at http://www.cglg.org/news/TheCompass/Compass-2006-Issue3.
pdf (discussing Ohio's legislative actions in 2006) [hereinafter Moving
Forward]. In February 2007 legislation was introduced to "form a task force to
determine whether Ohio should enter into" the Compact. See also S.B. 78 (Ohio
2007) (calling for the creation of a task form to determine if Ohio should enter
into the Compact) available at http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/7/
planing/greatlksgov/127_SB_78_I Y.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2007).
99 See id. Wisconsin has, however, created and charged a special committee with
addressing issues before the Compact bills are introduced. See Flesher, supra
note 96.
100
The United States Constitution states "No State shall, without the Consent of
congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. However, it should be noted
that not all compacts require consent. See ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra
note 79, at 23.
1l1 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) ("[W]here Congress has
authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the
subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional

192 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
to meet its obligations under such a102compact, then an aggrieved
party may bring enforcement actions.
C.

Understandingthe Needfor an Interstate Compact

To understand the need for an interstate compact, the vulnerabilities of existing agreements must be analyzed. These agreements include the Great Lakes Charter, the BWT and the WRDA.
As briefly discussed above, the Great Lakes Charter is not adequate because it is an unenforceable, voluntary agreement whose
implementation has been inconsistent. 10 3 The more complicated
issues are associated with BWT and WRDA, both of which are
controlled by the federal government.
1. The Boundary Waters Treaty's Scope Limit its Ability to Protect
the Basin
The Boundary Waters Treaty is unable to sufficiently
protect the Basin because, as mentioned above, its reach is fairly
limited. The Treaty grants the IJC authority over proposed
diversions from waters shared by the US and Canada only if it
would affect water levels or flows. 104 Nowhere does the Treaty call
for a ban on diversions. 0 5 Furthermore, this approval is only for

legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States' agreement into
federal law under the Compact Clause.").
102

See

ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL,

supra note 79, at 13-14. For the Great Lakes

Compact's specific enforcement provisions, see Compact, supra note 13, § 7.3.
103

Problems often associated with voluntary agreements are discussed in more

detail, see infra Part IV. D. 1.
Ministry of Natural Resources, Technical Fact Sheet, Enhancing Existing
Great Lakes Protections Through Charter Annex Implementing Agreements,
Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/nmr/water/greatlakes/
TFS-GLCA%20Agreement%20v.pdf.
104

105 See

id.
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direct diversions from
the Lakes; it does not include underground
06
water or tributaries.'
It is important to note that the Compact will supplement,
but not change the Boundary Waters Treaty. 107 This supplemental
role will help ensure all withdrawals are effectively managed. For
example, unlike the Treaty, the Compact applies to all Basin
waters including groundwater and tributaries.' 0 8 In addition the
Compact applies to both large diversions that may impact levels
and flows,
and smaller proposals, which the Treaty fails to
10 9
address.

2. The WRDA Could Not Sufficiently Protect the Great Lakes
Those in opposition to the Compact may see the WRDA as
an adequate means of protection for the Great Lakes. However,
constitutional issues, enforceability questions and legislative0
vulnerabilities make the WRDA's effectiveness questionable.
As mentioned above, the WRDA does not provide standards for
decision making and there is no requirement that decisions be

106

See id.

107

The Compact specifically states that "[n]othing in this compact is intended to

affect nor shall be construed to affect the application of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 whose requirements continue to apply in addition to the requirements of this Compact." See Compact, supra note 13, § 8.2(3).
108

Basin Water is defined as "the Great Lakes and all streams, rivers, lakes,

connecting channels and other bodies of water, including tributary groundwater,
within the Basin." Compact, supra note 13, § 1.2.
109 Larger proposals are addressed in sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.9 whereas smaller
diversions will be subject to state management, water conservation and
efficiency programs. Id. §§ 4.2, 4.10. 4.11.
110 See

ANNIN,

supra note 28, at 151 ("Many governors began to wonder about

the effectiveness of WRDA as a piece of water-management law."); see also id.
at 199 (citing James Lochhead stating the WRDA would not be able to stand
legal challenges because it is "unconstitutional and a violation of international
trade agreements").
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based on science. 11 Because of this, the WRDA has allowed
approval for diversions which are not backed by consistent
reasoning.112 Such blind decision making could be a target for a
constitutional challenge.' 13 Unlike the WRDA, the Compact
standards to ensure
includes science-based and conservation-based
114
decisions.
and
reasoning
consistent
Next, the fact that it would only take one sentence in a
piece of federal legislation to dramatically alter or destroy the
WRDA'1 5 is an inherent danger of using management creatures
controlled entirely by Congress. For example, one concern is
"Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause powers ...and
simply change the law, allowing both Great Lakes water and Great

111 See Johnson Testimony, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
112

Major diversion approvals under the WRDA include Pleasant Prairie,

Wisconsin and Akron, Ohio. See

GREAT LAKES WATER INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY
OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE, DIVERSIONS OF GREAT LAKES WATER: OUR
WATERS 2-3 (2006), available at http://www.glwi.uwm.edu/ourwaters/

documents/DiversionsWebO0O.pdf. For additional information on the Pleasant
Prairie and Akron diversions see generally ANNIN, supra note 28, at chs. 7, 10.
113

Commentators have argued that the WRDA's lack of standards violates the

nondelegation doctrine. See IJC,

PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT
LAKES, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES, at 36 (Feb. 2000) available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/

docs/IJC2000Report.pdf. While a successful delegation challenge is unlikely
considering there has not been once since the 1930's, it may still be possible.
See id. For example, in Whiteman v. American Trucking Association, where the
Supreme Court considered a delegation issue under the Clean Air Act, the court
alluded to the fact that even though delegation issues were rare, too broad a
delegation would be a violation of the Constitution. Whiteman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding there was no delegation problem with the
EPA's interpretation under the CAA, but suggesting too broad a delegation
would violate the Constitution).
114

See Compact, supra note 13, at arts. 3, 4 (addressing Compact decision-

making).
1.5 See

Johnson Testimony, supra note 18 (discussing Congress'

2000

amendment to the WRDA, stating that amendment "signal[s] that they
[Congress] can currently change the Great Lakes water management regime at
their pleasure, and that if the Great Lakes States don't act, Congress will").
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Lakes water management authority to be diverted out of the
region." 116 While a compact is not absolutely immune from a
Congressional amendment, 1 7 it does have the added protection of
approval from the state legislatures as well as increased public
visibility.11 8 Additionally, "once [the] compact is adopted by
be protected against challenges under the
Congress, [it] would
'119
commerce clause."
Finally, the WRDA does not provide for any kind of citizen
involvement, nor does it include citizen enforcement provisions.
For example, in Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v.
Great Spring Water of America, the court held private parties
could not take action if the Governors failed to act because the
WRDA does not provide for an express or implied right for private
action. 120 It has been argued that to "make the [WRDA] an effective tool for conserving the Great Lakes, private parties should be
given the ability to sue to enforce its provisions."' 2 1 Alternatively,
the compact does allow for private enforcement, stating "any
person may seek judicial review of the Council's actions, 122 "any

116 id.

"' See BROUN ET AL., supra note 17, at 43-47 (discussing the possibility of
congressional amendments to an interstate compact).
118

See id.; see also Hall, supra note 15, at 451 (discussing the difficulties

Congress may have in changing or repealing a compact) ("Congress would need
to overturn the express and collective legislative will of an entire region, something that has never occurred in the history of interstate water management
compacts.")
119 ANNIN,
120

supra note 28, at 204 (citing Mr. Lochhead).

Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Great Spring Water of Am.,

203 F. Supp. 2d 853, 863-64 (2002).
121

See Charles F. Glass, Jr., Note, Enforcing GreatLakes Water Export Restric-

tions Under the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1503, 1503 (2003) (stating the WRDA is "an ineffective tool for protecting
Great Lakes waters").
122

Compact, supra note 13, § 7.3(1) (emphasis added).
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123 and "any
person" may bring action to compel compliance,
24
action.'
aggrievedperson" may commence civil

D.

Benefits and Problems Associated With Interstate Compacts

1. Benefits of Interstate Compacts
As discussed above, the Basin State's goal was to protect
the Great Lakes by ensuring decision-making authority remained
within the region. The question is, will a compact effectively
accomplish these objectives? Considering the fact that "[t]he
interstate compact is the most binding legal instrument to provide
formal cooperation between states [and] [i]n recent decades.. .has
emerged as one of the better known and more widely employed
mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation,"' 125 arguably, it
will.126

First, unlike voluntary agreements, a compact is enforceable. While voluntary agreements may be the preferred choice in
certain situations, in the context of water management they have
proven to be problematic. The voluntary agreements addressing
water quality issues in the Chesapeake Bay help illustrate such
problems.

123

Id. § 7.3(2) (emphasis added).

124Id. §
25

7.3(3) (emphasis added).

ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra note 79, at ix; see also John J.

Mountjoy, State Solutions: interstate compacts remain powerful tools for
cooperative states' actions, STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS, June-July 2002, at 14

("Interstate compacts are powerful, durable and adaptive tools for promoting
and ensuring cooperative action among the States ... [and] one of the oldest
mechanisms available for States to work together.").
126 But see Mark S. Squillace, Rethinking the Great Lakes Compact, Mich. St. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (arguing the "proposed Compact is fundamentally
flawed and will not achieve the ultimate state goal of protecting and conserving
the water resources of the Great Lakes") available at papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.dfm?abstract_id=960574.
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Similar to the Great Lakes efforts, collective protection
efforts in the Chesapeake Bay date back to the 1980's.127 The most
recent agreement, Chesapeake 2000 (C2K), was signed in 2000.128
C2K is structured as a voluntary partnership between the state and
federal governments. It reaffirms previous water quality commitments and sets new goals to be achieved by 2010.129 Unfortunately,
implementation has been inconsistent and many target goals have
fallen off track. 130 Jonathon Cannon, author of Checking in on the
Chesapeake, states, "theorists have given us much reason to doubt
the efficacy of an institution like the CBP [Chesapeake Bay
Program], which depends so heavily on voluntary undertakings by
a diverse multitude of players-from Congress and federal
agencies to state governors and legislatures to local governments,
citizen groups and individual landowners."' 131 Similar doubts loom
in the Great Lakes where voluntary agreements addressing both
water quantity and quality have been in existence for decades.
Fortunately, as illustrated by the Great Lakes Compact, an interstate compact is capable of addressing some of the consistency,
commitment and implementation problems associated with voluntary agreements. For example, uncertainties can be minimized with
32
provisions that provide for sound, consistent decision making,'

127

128

See Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Agreement (1983).
See Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake 2000 (2000), available at

http://chesapeakebay.net/agreement.htm. It should be noted that unlike the Great
Lakes Compact which addresses water quantity, C2K addresses water quality.
129

See id. (stating the commitment to "nurture and sustain a Chesapeake Bay

Watershed partnership and to achieve the goals set forth in the subsequent
sections").
130

See, e.g. Maryland Department of Natural Resources, Chesapeake 2000 "The

Renewed Bay Agreement," http://dnrweb.dnr.state.md.us/bay/resprotect/c2k/
progress.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2007) (listing the progress of C2K
Commitments).
131

See Jonathan Cannon, Checking in on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of

Design, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1131, 1135-36 (2006).
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and enforcement mechanisms can be used to ensure member states
remain committed and meet established targets and goals.
Second, because a compact is permanent in nature, it is one
of the few instruments that can adequately provide for regional
stability and uniformity in decision making.1 33 Since water
quantity issues do not abide by political boundaries, a regional
134
focus is needed to effectively manage the Great Lakes Basin.
Finally, because a compact is considered a contract among
the signatory states, it can be tailored to meet the needs of each
management project, which "afford[s] states the opportunity to
develop dynamic, self-regulatory systems over which the party
states can maintain control through a coordinated legislative and
administrative process."' 35 Compacts "can evolve to meet new and
increased challenges that naturally arise over time." 136 There are
examples of successful compacts in a number of areas including
138
water pollution,137 migrating fish and radioactive waste. 139

132 See

Compact, supra note 13, § 1.3(2)(d) (stating a purpose of the Compact is

"[t]o facilitate consistent approaches to Water management across the Basin
while retaining State management authority over Water management decisions
within the basin").
133

See ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra note 79, at 42.

134

For example, a decision from within the region by all the regional bodies is

likely to be more "mutually beneficial" then one reached through litigation. See
Erik G. Davis, Comment, Interstate Compacts That Are for the Birds: A
Proposalfor Reconciling Federal Wetlands Protection with State Water Rights
Through Federal-InterstateCompacts, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 325, 342 (1996).
135 Michael L. Buenger & Richard L. Masters, The Interstate Compact on Adult

Offender Suspension: Using Old Tools to Solve New Problems, 9 Roger

Williams U. L. Rev. 71, 92 (2003).
136 id.

137 See New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact, Pub. L. No.
80-292, 61 Stat. 682 (1947).
138 See

Connecticut River Basin Atlantic Salmon Compact, Pub. L. No. 98-138,

97 Stat. 866 (1983).
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2. Potential Problems with Interstate Compacts
Despite the benefits an interstate compact has to offer, there
are weaknesses that must be identified. The first is the time it takes
to negotiate, draft and then finally ratify a compact between multiple jurisdictions. 140 This time criticism is not, however, unique to
interstate compacts. As discussed below, time is also a limiting
factor with other management approaches including court
determinations. 141
A second criticism is that interstate compacts can be
limited in scope because only signatory states are parties to the
agreement. In the context of the Great Lakes, this means that any
jurisdiction outside the basin will not have the power to vote in
Compact affairs. At first glance, this appears problematic for the
Basin because Canada cannot be a party to the interstate compact
due to constitutional restrictions.142 But, in an effort to establish a
balanced management system, two agreements have been created:
the Interstate Compact and the Sustainable Water Resources
Agreement. 143 These agreements mimic one another in goals,
objectives and requirements. 144 Canada's membership in the Compact's parallel agreement will help ensure withdrawal
management
45
efforts are consistent throughout the Basin. 1
139

See Southwestern Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Consent

Act, Pub. L. No. 100-712, 102 Stat. 4773 (1988).
140

See ZIMMERMAN

141

See infra Part V. C..

142

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10 (prohibiting any state from entering into a

& WENDELL,

supra note 79, at 54.

"Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation with a foreign power" but allowing entry
into an "Agreement or Compact" with consent of Congress).
143

See Canadian Environmental Law Association, Why is the GreatLakes Basin

Sustainable Water Agreement Important to Ontario?,THE WATERHOLE, Sept. 9,
2004, at 4, available at www.thewaterhole.ca/twp/GLBWA.doc.
44

Cf Compact, supra note 13, and Sustainable Water Resources Agreement,

supra note 12.
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146
A final criticism is that interstate compacts are inflexible,
and if poorly drafted, may not be able to adapt to changing
conditions in environmental regulations, ecological changes, or
population growth. 147 A common example of unyielding permanency is in the Rio Grande and Pecos River Compact, where new
mandates under the Endangered Species Act have caused extreme
difficulties for the participating148states to allocate water in compliance with the compact's terms.
149
However, as briefly discussed in the benefits section,
permanency is not necessarily a negative characteristic.' 50 Here, it
is likely to be a virtue. The Great Lakes Basin is a vast, complex,
multi-jurisdictional ecosystem where consistent and uniform
management is difficult. For years, the Basin Signatories have
been looking for some way to preserve their resource in perpetuity.
Unlike some of the Western Compacts, where permanency
problems are clearly illustrated by unyielding allocation numbers,
the Great Lakes Compact does not include concrete allocation
numbers. 15 1 Additionally, a compact "provides for flexibility as to
145According

to Molly Flanagan, National Wildlife Federation, "Quebec has
already completed a review of their laws, and has implemented legislation, or
rules that are necessary in order for Quebec to come into compliance with the
compact, .

.

. Ontario is in the process of doing that right now ....

" Bob

Kelleher, Minnesota considers plan to keep Great Lakes water in the Great

Lakes,

MINNESOTA

PUBLIC RADIO,

Feb. 11, 2007, available at http://

minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/02/09/gtlakescompact/.
146 ZIMMERMAN
147

& WENDELL, supra note 79, at 55.

See Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the

Virtue of Permanence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REv.

105, 106-09 (2003).
48

1

See id. at 109-14.

141
See infra Part IV. D. 1.and sources cited.
150Guiding

principles to avoid problems of permanency include: "no compact

should have a scope larger than what the project absolutely requires" and each
compact "should include the most liberal amendment and termination provisions
constitutionally permissible ...." Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a

Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REv. 1, 35 (1997).
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its implementation, administration, and interpretation when decisions are made at the State level."'' 5 2 If permanency and inflexibility issues do develop, then the compact can be amended. 153
V.

ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT TOOLS CANNOT OFFER ALL
THE BENEFITS OF AN INTERSTATE COMPACT

There is no question that the Great Lakes are a valuable,
nonrenewable resource that require protection. The more difficult
question is how to provide this protection? As illustrated by the
above discussion of the compact's benefits and criticisms, an
interstate compact fulfilled the needs and desires of the Great
Lakes Signatories.154 However, an interstate compact was not the
only management option available.
Alternatives included federalization, amendments to either
the Great Lakes Charter or the Great Lakes Basin Compact,' 55 or
court determinations. As discussed below, these alternatives could
not fulfill the Basin's needs or provide the benefits of a compact.

151 For

example, problems with allocation numbers set forth in the 1949 Pecos

River Compact led to litigation and a $14 million settlement. See Grant, supra
note 147, at 110.
152Johnson

Testimony, supra note 18; see also BROUN

ET AL.,

supra note 17, at

27. "States acting jointly can control not only the solution to a problem but also
shape the future agenda as the problem changes." Id.
153 It should be noted that trying to amend a compact can be very difficult and

time consuming because any amendment will have to be adopted by each state.
See Hall, supra note 15, at 445. Aside from amendments, the only other ways to
"change the substance of a compact is through withdrawal and renegotiation of
its terms." BROUN ET AL., supra note 17, at 23. The Great Lakes Compact
provides for amendments. See Compact, supra note 13, § 8.5.
154 A compact allows the decision-making authority to remain in the basin. See

Johnson Testimony, supra note 18.
'55 The Great Lakes Basin Compact, created in 1968, addresses economic and
environmental issues in the Basin. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. 90-149
(1968). It does not, however, address the management of withdrawals.
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A.

Federalizationof the GreatLakes Basin

In the past, federalization has been a favorite scheme for
environmental regulation and management. Such programs are
controlled predominately by the56 federal government. A classic
example is the Clean Water Act.'
In the case of the Great Lakes, if federalization of the
Basin's water management was the chosen management scheme,
then like other federal programs, diversion decision-making
authority would be in the hands of the federal government. This is
exactly what the Compact Signatories wanted to avoid; the goal
was to keep diversion authority within the Basin. 157 A compact
"[u]nlike federal actions that impose unilateral, rigid mandates,"
allows states "to develop dynamic, self-regulatory
systems over
' 58
which the member states can maintain control."'
B.

Amending Previous Agreements

The simplest option before the Signatories may have been
to amend existing agreements such as the Great Lakes Basin
Compact or the Great Lakes Charter. Amending the Great Lakes
Basin Compact would have allowed for the creation of a binding,
enforceable agreement; however, if this Compact was open for
revisions, it would have provided Congress with the opportunity to
expand its role in decision-making. This posed a tremendous risk
because, again, the fundamental goal was to keep the decisionmaking authority within the Basin.

156

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2003).

157

"The goal remains the same-retaining the authority over Great Lakes Water

Management with the Great Lakes States." Johnson Testimony, supra note 18.
See also US EPA Great Lakes, Significant Activities Great Lakes Mayor's Meet,
July 2004, available at http://www.epa.gov/ginpo/active/2004/jul04.html#
Lakes%20Mayors (stating "Governor Doyle stressed the need for protecting the
waters of the Great Lakes through Annex 2001 and against 'federalization of
water."').
158 BROUN ET AL.,

supra note 17, at 27.
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Alternatively, amendments to the Great Lakes Charter
would have kept the federal government out, 59 but it would have
only allowed for a voluntary, non-binding agreement; the Signatories were seeking more. Creating an entirely new agreement
provided less risk of federal intrusion and allowed for a binding,
enforceable agreement.
C.

Court Determinations

An alternative to government management is to have courts
micro-manage allocation and diversions through equitable apportionment determinations. However, history indicates this type of
management is far from ideal. Complications associated with court
apportionment decisions are illustrated by Idaho ex rel. Andrus v.
Oregon, where Idaho sought an equitable apportionment for
anadromous fish migrating throughout the Columbia-Snake River
System. 160 The suit originated in 1976.161 After three appearances
before the Supreme Court and two trips to a special master, a final
decision was rendered seven years later, in 1983.162
Additionally, courts are often ill-equipped to make technical and localized diversion decisions, even when aided by a special
master.163 Such determinations are often better left to local
159

The Federal Government is not a party to the Great Lakes Charter. See

Charter, supra note 33 (the Findings state "[t]he Governors and Premiers of the
Great Lakes State and Provinces jointly find and declare...").
160

Idaho ex rel. Andrus v. Oregon, 429 U.S. 163 (1976).

161 Id.

162 See

Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1023-29 (1983). Other

examples of lengthy equitable apportionment cases include Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907) (determining apportionment of the Arkansas River); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 496-97 (1922) (holding Colorado could not
divert water without first considering claims of prior appropriators); Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 672 (1931) (upholding the Special Master's
decision because there was no evidence of a "real or substantial" injury).
163 See

Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States, 12

SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL.

L.J. 115, 126-27 (2004).
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authorities. When a judge renders a decision, parties are left
powerless and the outcome is uncertain.164 A compact minimizes
this uncertainty by giving the signatories, not an outside third
party, control over management.
VI.

THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT PROCESS: A LIKELY SUCCESS
STORY FOR TODAY AND THE FUTURE

Though the compact has not been formally approved and
ratified by all the respective State Legislatures and Congress, it
still represents a major milestone in environmental resource
management. 165 It is the culmination of four and a half years of
negotiation with many stake-holders involving
what is inherently a
66
very contentious issue: water allocation.'
The success in reaching this agreement can be largely
attributed to the process.' 67 Regular public meetings and representtation of all parities and views, including agriculture, industry, and
environmentalists, were keys for success.'68 69
Furthermore,
cooperation and trust among all parties was essential.

164

See id. at 127.

165 Many

commentators agree that the Great Lakes Compact represents a success

in environmental management and can serve as a model in future management
efforts. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 15.
166 See Johnson Testimony, supra note 18 (stating this Compact "reflects a
delicate compromise between varied and diverse interests across the vast Great
Lakes region").
167 See Interview with Reg Gilbert, Senior Coordinator, Great Lakes United (Jan.
20, 2006) [hereinafter Gilbert Interview]. Decisions were made by consensus to
ensure "solutions were developed that attempt to meet the interests of all
members." See The Council of Great Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes - St.
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact Resource Kit, May 15, 2006,
at 9 available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GLCompactResource
Kit-5-15-06.pdf
168See

Johnson Testimony, supra note 18 (listing the stakeholders and public

meetings).
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To further illustrate the potential success of the Great Lakes
Compact, the remainder of this paper will compare it to the Delaware River Basin Compact and the Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeFlint River Compact.
A.

The Delaware River Basin Compact as a Success Story

To create a sound, effective agreement, the drafters of the
new Great Lakes Compact referred to existing compacts and
models. Included in these references was the Delaware River Basin
Compact (Delaware Compact), 170 which is considered one of the
most successful interstate water allocation agreements.171
The Delaware River Basin is shared between Delaware,
New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. Disputes over the Basin
brought the States before the Supreme Court for an apportionment
hearing in 1931172 and again in 1954.173 The Supreme Court was

able to solve the dispute, but failed to solve the underlying problem
of the States acting as independent, interest-driven entities. In an
169

170

See Gilbert Interview, supra note 167.
Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961)

[hereinafter Delaware Compact]. This is the second compact agreement created
for the Delaware River Basin, the first was approved by Congress in 1952. See
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Transboundary Water Allocation in the Twenty-First
Century: Colloquium Article: Interstate Struggles over Rivers: The Southeastern
States and the Struggle over the 'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 828, 842-43
(2005). The second compact, which was used as a model by the Great Lakes
Compact drafters, added the federal government as a party to the Commission
and gave the Commission planning and operational powers in addition to its
previous regulatory powers. See id. at 843.
171 The

Delaware Compact has been so successful that the Susquehanna River

Basin adopted it as a model "with only minor changes in the 1970s." See
Dellapenna, supra note 170, at 849.
172

See N.J. v. N.Y., 283 U.S. 336 (1931).

173

See N.J. v. N.Y., 347 U.S. 995 (1954) (modifying the original 1931 appor-

tionment).
114

See Clemons, supra note 163, at 132.
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effort to unify and coordinate "policies for water conservation,
control, use and management in the basin," the Delaware Basin
states created
the Delaware River Basin Compact (Delaware
175
Compact).
The Delaware Compact and the Great Lakes Compact have
similar structures. Both Compacts create an advisory committee
for implementation and management. In the Delaware Compact,
this is referred to as the Commission whereas in the Great Lakes
Compact, it is the Council. 17 6 Additionally, the Delaware Compact
and the Great Lakes Compact use a similar voting scheme. For
most issues, a simple majority is needed and unanimity is reserved
for few issues.

177

Similarities aside, there are important differences in the
federal government's role and in the Compacts' scope. First, the
Delaware Compact includes the federal government as a party to
the Commission.178 By contrast, the Great Lakes Compact does not
allow the79 federal government to have a direct role in the
Council. 1
In terms of scope, both agreements address withdrawals
and diversions. The Delaware Commission's right to regulate individual withdrawals with permits is, however, limited because
permits are only required in "protected areas" and the Commission's authority to regulate within these "protected areas" has been
"delegated to the states that have enacted a regulated riparian

§ 3.1.

175

Delaware Compact, supra note 170,

176

Cf id. at art. 2 (Organization and Area), and Compact, supra note 13, at art. 2

(Organization).
177 See Compact, supra note 13, § 2.4(2); see also Dellapenna, supra note 170, at
844 (discussing the Delaware Compact's voting scheme).
178 See

Delaware Compact, supra note 170, § 2.2 ("The Commission shall

consist of the governors of the signatory states, ex-offico, and one commissioner
to be appointed by the President of the United States to serve during the term of
office of the President.").
179See Compact, supra note 13, § 2.2 ("The Council shall consist of the
Governors of the Parties, ex officio.").
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system of water law." 180 State decisions will be superseded only in
water emergency situations.' 8 1 In comparison, the Great Lakes
Council has greater authority over the review and approval of
diversions and management systems 182 and' 83the Council's authority
is not restricted to "emergency situations."
Furthermore, in addition to water quantity, the Delaware
compact focuses on a number of other areas including water
84
quality, flood protection, pollution control, and recreation.
Alternatively, the Great Lakes Compact focus is limited to an
ecosystem approach to water quantity management.Is5 Great Lakes
water pollution is addressed in entirely18 6separate agreements, the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements.
B.

Lessons to be learnedfrom the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-FlintRiver Basin

Unlike the successes of the Delaware Compact, the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, with over two
decades of water 87allocation disputes, provides a model for
problems to avoid. 1

'80

Dellapenna, supra note 170, at 845-46. (discussing the "compact's regulatory

system") (citing Delaware Compact, at art. 10).
181See id. at 846.
182

See generally Compact, supra note 13, at arts. 3-4.

183See,
184

e.g., Compact, supra note 13, § 4.7(1).

See generally Delaware Compact, supra note 170, at arts. 4-10 (each Article

is devoted to one of the Commission's major water responsibilities).
185

See, e.g., Compact, supra note 13, § 1.4.

186

See generally Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15,

1972, amended by Protocol Amending the Agreement Between the United
States of America and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality of 1978, U.S.Can., Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11,551.

208 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

The Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint Rivers flow
through Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. There have been water
shortages in the region for years. In 1990, Alabama finally brought

suit against the Army Corps of Engineers after they proposed to
reallocate water from Lake Lanier's hydropower supply to
Georgia's future water supply needs.188 The Court permitted
Georgia, Alabama and Florida to conduct extensive research and

studies, resulting in the conclusion that an interstate compact
would best resolve allocation issues.1 89 In 1997, with the approval
of Congress, the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Compact
(ACF) was created.'

9°

The ACF "allowed each state to study the

Corps of Engineers' completed research, and to negotiate a water
allocation formula accordingly."' 19 1 Unfortunately, the Commission
charged with determining an allocation number was never able to
agree and the compact expired. 192 After years of frustration and
millions of dollars spent, there is94 still no agreement. 193 This again
will be a problem for the courts.'

187

Problems first arose after a 1986 drought in Georgia. See Charles Seabrook,

Atlanta to Get More Water From Lanier, ATLANTA J. &
at Al.
188

CONST.,

June 10, 1988,

See Charles DuMars & David Seeley, The Failure of the Apalachicola-

Chattahoochee-FlintRiver Basin and Alabama-Coosa-TallapoosaRiver Basin
Compacts and a Guide to the Successful Establishment of Interstate Water
Compacts, 21 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 373, 377-78 (2004).
189

190

See Clemons, supra note 163, at 136-37.
See Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No.

105-104, 111 Stat. 2233 (1997).
'9'See Dustin S. Stephenson, The Tri-State Compact: Falling Water and Fading
Opportunities, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 83, 101 (2000).
192The

compact expired on August 31, 2003. Clemons, supra note 163, at 138-39.

'9'As of 2002, $20 million had already been spent in efforts to establish an
allocation number. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY

AND

TECHNOLOGY,

THE

ENVIRONMENTAL

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EPA 14 (2002).
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Part of the ACF's failure may be attributed to the structure
of the decision-making provisions. The agreement required
unanimity, but did not provide195a way to overcome an impasse,
which was fatal to negotiations.
Alternatively, the Great Lakes Compact is structured to
overcome impasse. The Compact recognizes that it is "preferable
for all members of the Regional Body to agree," ' 96 but in the event
they do not, they "shall make every reasonable effort to achieve
consensus within 25 days."' 197 If the Regional body is still unable to
reach a consensus, a declaration of findings will be released to the
public and the Originating Party and Council will use these
findings to make a decision.' 98 Additionally, the Great Lakes
Compact also provides for the use of alternative dispute resolution
disagree on "interpretation,
mechanisms in the event the parties
199
implementation."'
and
application
VII.

CONCLUSION

Growing populations face a similar problem: how to
effectively manage nonrenewable, complex, natural resources
across jurisdictional boundaries? There are a variety of
management tools available; the challenge is finding the one that is
most effective.
94

See DuMars & Seeley, supra note 188, at 385 ("Now that Georgia, Alabama,
and Florida have chosen not to negotiate an interstate compact or to allocate by
compromise, the courts have become the only alternative.").
1

'95 See Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, supra note 190,
at art. VII(d) (stating the allocation formula must be "unanimously decided").
For additional commentary on the failure of the ACF negotiations, see generally
Benjamin L. Snowden, Note, Bargainingin the Shadow of Uncertainty: Understanding the Failure of the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J.
134 (2005).
196

Compact, supra note 13, § 4.5(5)(d).

'9

Id. § 4.5(5)(f).

198 Id. § 4.5(5)(h)-(i).
99

1

Id. § 7.2.
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The Great Lakes Basin, holding the largest accessible
supply of fresh water, chose to protect and manage its resource
through the creation of an interstate compact. Arguably, an interstate compact is the best tool available to manage the Great Lakes'
water.
Compacts, in general, provide signatories with the ability to
manage their regional resources through an enforceable, durable
agreement. Furthermore, because signatories can draft their own
agreements, like a contract, compact provisions can be properly
tailored to meet regional needs and concerns. The Great Lakes
Compact represents an environmental milestone and is likely to
serve as a model for future multi-jurisdictional environmental
resource management efforts.

